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Ostensibly, private equity (PE) ﬁrms buy companies, ﬁx them, and then sell them. How is it
that PE ﬁrms are able to do this and why were the companies unable to ﬁx themselves in the ﬁrst
place? The mantra in the literature is that PE ﬁrms mitigate managerial agency problems—
they create value by improving management.1 Three mechanisms are emphasized: (i) greater
debt disciplines managers, (ii) enhanced governance, and (iii) increased managerial incentives.
In this study we examine the changes in managerial incentives caused by PE ﬁrms.
Managers as owners is a pillar of the PE approach. But how does the ownership of managers
diﬀer between public companies and PE portfolio companies, where managers in both cases have
stock options and incentive plans of some kind? Kaplan (1989) ﬁrst documented diﬀerences in
the share of CEO equity ownership between publicly traded ﬁrms, and ﬁrms that had undergone
a management buyout. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) provide a similar analysis, but no
prior study has examined these eﬀects on post-1990 buyouts, as we do here. It is important
to examine more recent data because the buyout market in the 1990s and 2000s operates quite
diﬀerently from the 1980s (as discussed by Cao and Lerner, 2007), and also because there is
reason to believe public corporations may have adopted some of the practices of PE companies.
We compare managerial incentives at public companies with PE-owned companies, using
data for U.S. ﬁrms during the period 1996 to 2006. A key challenge in this research is obtaining
data on managerial incentives at PE portfolio companies, which are not required to disclose
such information. Our approach is to collect data on companies that have PE owners and
undergo an IPO (sometimes referred to as a reverse LBO). In such cases the PE-owned ﬁrms are
required to disclose the same information as a public company for the two years prior to the IPO.
The dataset covers 144 such companies. We then go on to measure whether PE-owned ﬁrms
outperform their public counterparts in proﬁtability and operational eﬃciency and to determine
if any diﬀerences between PE-owned ﬁrms and public ﬁrms persist after PE owned ﬁrms go
public. This is important because of a debate as to whether PE ﬁrms, in fact, create value or
capture value (from pre-buyout investors and employees, say).2
1See Jensen (1986 and 1989).
2See, for example: Davis, et al, (2008), and Guo, Hotchkiss and Song (2008).
1Numerous papers study executive compensation in public companies.3 However, there is very
little research on managerial incentives at private companies.4 Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001)
argue that many public corporations actually adopted the beneﬁcial PE practices in the 1990s,
driven by two changes: (i) innovation in information and communication technology made capital
markets more eﬃcient (i.e., enhanced disciplining); and (ii) deregulation increased the rewards
to restructuring.5 Others are more skeptical, such as Bebchuk and Fried (2004) who argue that
managerial power continues to drive executive compensation in most public corporations, to the
detriment of shareholders.
Since there is reason to expect public companies have adopted some of the practices of PE
in the years since Kaplan’s study, and also because it is conceivable that PE has signiﬁcantly
evolved, it is timely to assess whether these diﬀerences in managerial incentives have persisted.
Furthermore, we seek to examine broader evidence on managerial incentives than simply the
fraction of equity owned by the CEO (although that is one important measure).
We ﬁnd that, as conventional wisdom and economic theory suggest, top executive incentives
are much stronger at PE-owned companies than at comparable publicly traded companies. More
speciﬁcally, relative to his counterpart at a publicly traded company in the same industry with
similar observable characteristics, the highest paid executive at a PE-owned ﬁrm owns approx-
imately twice as large a share of the ﬁrm, earns about 12% less in base pay, and receives a
substantially larger share of his cash compensation through variable pay. These diﬀerences do
not exist at companies before they are bought by PE ﬁrms, suggesting that these diﬀerences
are the result of PE ownership. We do not ﬁnd, however, that PE-owned ﬁrms are substan-
tially more successful than comparable public ﬁrms in operating metrics such as return on assets
(ROA), operating income, or headcount. While the incentives given to PE-owned ﬁrms’ man-
agers keep their companies operating at average levels of proﬁtability and eﬃciency, we do not
ﬁnd evidence that they create signiﬁcant excess proﬁts. Finally, we show that any diﬀerences
between PE-owned ﬁrms and public ﬁrms quickly disappear after PE-owned ﬁrms execute an
IPO. Within a year of the IPO, the previously PE-owned ﬁrm has managerial incentives and
debt levels similar to comparable public ﬁrms.
3See Murphy (1999) for a detailed review of the literature.
4Exceptions include Kaplan (1989), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) and a case study by Baker and
Wruck (1989).
5See also Hermalin (2005).
2In the next section we describe anecdotal evidence about the range of managerial incentives
implemented by PE ﬁrms in their portfolio companies. In Section 3 we summarize the data
used in our study. Section 4 then contains our analysis of the diﬀerences in managerial incen-
tives between public corporations and PE-owned companies. In Section 5 we examine evidence
concerning operational diﬀerences, and in Section 6 we explore the longevity of high managerial
incentives once a PE-owned ﬁrm undergoes an IPO. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Background on PE Firms
In this section we provide an overview of some of the key changes that PE ﬁrms implement
in managerial compensation at their portfolio companies. The information in this section is
based on interviews we performed with a half dozen experienced executives at several leading
PE ﬁrms. The purpose of including this information is to expand our understanding beyond the
limited set of facts we are able to study in the formal empirical analysis. It is common in the
literature on private equity to propose that enhanced managerial incentives are a major driver
of value creation. However, we are unaware of any paper that provides a description of what
“enhanced managerial incentives” entails, other than the evidence provided by Kaplan (1989)
and Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), showing that the fraction of equity owned by the CEO
tends to increase. While this is an important feature (which we also examine), the interviews
we summarize below clearly indicate that increasing CEO equity is one piece of a more complex
set of changes.
Enhanced equity participation is not limited to the CEO. Not surprisingly, all members of
the senior management team (Chief Financial Oﬃcer, Chief Operations Oﬃcer, Chief Technical
Oﬃcer, and so forth) also obtain signiﬁcant equity stakes in almost every instance. However,
PE ﬁrms tend to seek even broader participation. Typically, the top 20 to 80 managers in
an acquired company obtain signiﬁcant equity. The number may vary according to the kind
of business: manufacturing ﬁrms tend to involve fewer managers in equity participation, while
service ﬁrms tend to involve more managers. It is not unusual to have 150 or more participating
managers. One PE executive told us of a deal that included 500 managers in the equity program.
A very important aspect of the equity programs is that managers are required to contribute
3capital—managers purchase the equity with their own personal funds. One interviewee explained
that equity sharing is less about compensation of managers than it is about investment by
managers. Arguably, this feature is why managerial equity programs are the cornerstone of the
PE model which transforms managers as agents into managers as owners.
Exposing managers to downside risk may be as important for motivating managers as the
potential upside. However, the interviewees also emphasized that requiring managers to invest
themselves helps to reveal information (as in Lazear, 2005.) If any manager is unwilling to make
a signiﬁcant investment (often described as an investment on par with their home) then it is
crucial to understand why. Is it because of personal ﬁnancial limitations? If so, the PE ﬁrm
will ﬁnd creative ways to help the manager invest. Or is it because the manager has private
information about the business that brings into question future proﬁtability? Hence, increased
equity participation of managers may be as important for mitigating adverse selection as it is
for overcoming moral hazard.
Alongside equity investments by managers are stock options which are granted in proportion
to the initial investment by managers (although not necessarily the same proportion for all
managers in a ﬁrm). It is typical for a CEO to obtain two to three times their initial equity
in options. Options vest uniformly, often over ﬁve years. There may be some controversy
surrounding CEO options in particular, since other managers may obtain lower multiples than
the CEO, which can be interpreted as a form of kick-back for CEOs to push the deal. A simple
example of a CEO equity package is as follows. Suppose the PE ﬁrm acquires the target company
for $8 billion, with 50% leverage (i.e. $4 billion in equity, and $4 billion in debt). Suppose the
PE ﬁrm expects to sell the business for $16 billion, yielding a 200% return on equity (ROE).
The CEO may invest $5 million of his personal wealth (which is often a rollover of the equity
previously owned in the company) and obtain three times that in options for a total stake of
$20 million. With 200% ROE, the CEO obtains $60 million upon exit. CEO ownership may
increase when competition among PE ﬁrms for deals is intensiﬁed.
PE ﬁrms also expend signiﬁcant eﬀort re-designing cash bonus structures for managers.
The changes are customized to speciﬁc businesses, but are generally said to involve an increase
in the performance weighting and amended performance criteria. It is unclear if the overall
level of cash bonuses is increased, but it is probably not decreased. Some interviewees at PE
4ﬁrms asserted the changes they implement should have already been done by the ﬁrms.6 Other
interviewees said that such changes reﬂected strategic re-direction. Others again emphasized
that the changes in bonus structures were not necessarily better, and indeed may be worse
in some dimensions. This could be because PE ﬁrms are not expert in utilizing non-ﬁnancial
measures that encourage leadership development, for example. According to the interviewees,
salaries are largely unchanged.
There is an interesting question concerning the role of exit: does the fact that PE ﬁrms intend
to exit (after ﬁve years, say) enhance or diminish the eﬀectiveness of managerial incentives? On
the one hand, managers and investors both obtain a liquidity event at the same time, providing
alignment around timing. In contrast, with public companies managers may divest sooner than
investors would prefer. On the other hand, there can be disagreement between managers and
the PE ﬁrm concerning the details of exit. For example, managers may prefer not exiting via
an IPO, since they are required to hold stock for a minimum period, delaying their liquidity
event. Several interviewees made the compelling point that PE ﬁrms tend to favor managers
when discord arises, since it is essential to maintain a reputation for treating managers well.
It would be ideal to obtain data on all managers equity investments, option grants, and
bonus structures, in order to formally analyze/verify the generality of the anecdotal evidence
discussed here. By its very nature, it is diﬃcult to obtain information on the practices of private
equity ﬁrms for a broad sample, let alone such conﬁdential details of managerial incentives.7 In
the next section we describe the data utilized in our formal analysis, which has some obvious
limitations we shall discuss. However, the advantage of our dataset is that we have information
about 144 PE-owned companies with a clear selection criteria, allowing readers to evaluate the
generality of our ﬁndings.
6Consistent with this view, prior research has noted the diﬃculty of changing compensation structures, and
that such changes are more likely in the face bankruptcy or other dramatic changes in ownership structure—people
are more willing to accept change when they feel less secure in their jobs. See, for example, Schaefer (1998).
7Indeed, even for public companies this level of detail is not usually available.
53 Data Summary
We used CapitalIQ to generate lists of two types of ﬁrms that have time periods where they
are owned by a PE ﬁrm and other periods where they are publicly traded (and, therefore,
must disclose ﬁnancial and compensation data). First, we looked at all ﬁrms that, according
to CapitalIQ, underwent a leveraged buyout (LBO) between 1996 and 2004, and completed an
IPO after the LBO but before the end of 2005. We dropped ﬁrms that we determined to be
venture capital-backed (rather than PE-backed). This is our PE-owned companies sample. In
the analysis below, we clarify when we use information about these ﬁrms during the private
ownership phase and when we use information about these ﬁrms after they have gone public.
There are 144 ﬁrms in this group. Table 1 shows the number of LBOs and IPOs by year for the
PE-owned companies in our dataset. Most LBOs are early in the sample period, which is to be
expected given the ﬁrm must go public by 2005. The IPOs build over the sample years, with a
distinct drop during the weak stock market of 2001–2003.
The second type of ﬁrm in our dataset, which we refer to as the going private group, is all
ﬁrms that CapitalIQ lists as having a “going private transaction” between the beginning of 1998
and October of 2007, and for which there is some compensation data available in Standard and
Poors’ ExecuComp database. There are 89 ﬁrms in this group. The annual rate at which ﬁrms
enter this group went up dramatically in 2004–2006 because of the wave of large PE-backed
purchases. These larger ﬁrms were more likely to be included in ExecuComp. Table 1 shows
the annual rate of going private for ﬁrms in this group.
For the PE-owned ﬁrms, we downloaded the names of all executives and all compensation
information listed by CapitalIQ. We supplemented the compensation information with data from
Standard and Poors’ ExecuComp database in the few cases where it held relevant information.
In most cases, we used ﬁrms’ proxy statements to ﬁll in compensation information. This com-
pensation data is matched to accounting and stock return data from Compustat and CRSP,
respectively.
The PE-owned companies in our sample are a subset of all PE-owned businesses. Str¨ omberg (2008)
ﬁnds that only 13% of PE exits between 1970 and 2007 are via an IPO, which is a necessary
condition to enter our sample. One concern is that our sample is not representative of all PE-
6owned companies. Although we are unaware of a particular reason why managerial incentives
at PE-owned ﬁrms that have an IPO would be diﬀerent than other PE-owned ﬁrms, this is an
important caveat to our research.
A more important concern relates to selection. The fact that we do not observe pre-
acquisition incentives for our sample of PE-owned companies raises the question that PE ac-
quirers may target companies with already high managerial incentives. Hence, a ﬁnding that
PE-owned companies have high managerial incentives may be due to selection, rather than a
causal eﬀect due to changes that are implemented by the new owners. Our second group of
ﬁrms—the going-private sample—allows us to control for selection because we see the charac-
teristics of ﬁrms that are attractive to PE ﬁrms but are not yet owned by them.
We were only able to identify ﬁve companies that went from public to private and back to
public in the time frame of our analysis. We refer to these ﬁrms as the public-PE-public group.
This sample is too small for formal analysis, but we use one company in this group (Petco) for
illustrative purposes.
We also generated a comparison sample that includes all ﬁrm-years in ExecuComp that are
not in one of the other two samples. ExecuComp oversamples large ﬁrms (it includes the entire
Standard and Poors’ 500), so the comparison sample ﬁrms are larger, on average, than the two
PE samples. We limit the comparison sample to a subset of smaller ﬁrms that more closely
match those in the other samples for some of our analysis.
To understand the logic of our identiﬁcation strategy, note that we had hoped to make
more use of the public-PE-public group (or, as Cao and Lerner (2007) refer to them, “reverse
LBOs”) by analyzing ﬁrms’ PE ownership stage relative to both a pre-LBO and post-IPO stage.
However, the sample size using our time frame and criteria is simply too small. This is because,
as Str¨ omberg (2008) shows, only 6% of PE owned companies were stand-alone public ﬁrms
before a PE ﬁrm bought them. Using two recent prominent investments by Texas Paciﬁc Group
(TPG) as examples, Burger King was part of a large British conglomerate and J. Crew Group
was private and largely owned by the founder’s family before TPG invested in them. As a result,
when these companies later went public, it was not possible to track their compensation and
performance from a public stage to a private stage and back to a second public phase.
7Further complicating this non-comparability issue is the fact that, as already noted, only
13% of PE owned ﬁrms leave PE ownership through IPO. As a result, we focus on diﬀerences
between ﬁrms in their private phase and those that are public as our estimate of diﬀerences
between PE-owned ﬁrms and public ﬁrms. Then we look at diﬀerences between public ﬁrms
and ﬁrms that are about to go private, to see if there are systematic diﬀerences between public
ﬁrms and ﬁrms that have a PE-owned stage when both groups are publicly held.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for all four groups of ﬁrms in our dataset. As expected,
the comparison sample is noticeably larger by most measures than any of the other groups. The
diﬀerence is not as large in the medians, however, because PE ﬁrms make fewer investments in
the largest corporations that drive up the average size of public ﬁrms.
The table shows summary statistics for three measures of managerial incentives for each
sample. Each measure corresponds to compensation for the executive with the highest salary
at each company in any given year (invariably the CEO).8 “Executive Ownership” in the table,
which we refer to as fraction of the ﬁrm’s stock owned by the highest paid executive below, is
the number of shares that the executive either owns outright or holds options to buy divided
by the number of shares outstanding. “Non-Salary Cash Pay” (or variable pay share of cash
compensation below) is all cash pay that is not the executive’s base salary divided by total cash
compensation.
4 Managerial Incentives in Private Equity Owned Businesses
As noted in the introduction, one view of PE ﬁrms is that they create value in the businesses
they acquire as a result of improved management. Some of the improvement may stem from
management turnover, but the literature tends to emphasize the role of reduced agency costs.
That is, PE mitigates the principal-agent problem between managers and owners via a combi-
nation of higher debt levels, enhanced monitoring, and increased incentives. It is conceivable
these three factors are complementary, substitutes, or simply additive in their combined eﬀect
on ﬁrm performance.
8CapitalIQ does not provide position information. We are in the process of gathering position information for
the PE-owned sample (it is available for the other samples in ExecuComp) for use in future drafts.
8To illustrate the changes in managerial incentives that take place when a PE ﬁrm acquires a
public company, consider the example of Petco and the equity ownership of CEO Bruce Devine,
as depicted in Figure 1. This example is one of the ﬁve ﬁrms in the public-PE-public group
discussed above. Between 1995 and 1999, during the initial public phase, Devine owned about
2% of the equity. After Petco was taken private in 2000, Devine’s ownership share sharply
increased to about 10%. Petco undertook an IPO in 2002 and Devine’s share was immediately
reduced to about 7%, and then continued to fall after that. Devine stepped down as CEO in
2004 but continued as Petco’s Chairman. By 2006, he owned about 4% of Petco. When Petco
went private again in 2006, Devine’s role in the company had been reduced and he did not
increase his stake. PE ownership is associated with higher top management ownership in the
case of Petco. We will show below that this example is representative of PE-owned ﬁrms.
To examine these eﬀects more generally, we estimate the following speciﬁcation:
Yit = α + X0
itβ + θ1PrivateEquityit + θ2GoingPrivateit + it (1)
in which Yit is one of the three measures for managerial incentives (discussed in Section 3) at
ﬁrm i in year t, and X is a vector of control variables that includes observed ﬁrm characteristics
(assets, sales, market capitalization, employees, cash/assets), 2-digit SIC dummies, and year
dummies. There are two key variables of interest. First, PrivateEquityit is a dummy equal to
one for companies that are owned by a PE ﬁrm. We only include these ﬁrms in the last year
before they go public (that is, while they are still owned by PE ﬁrms.) Second, GoingPrivateit
is a dummy equal to one for public companies in their last year before being acquired by a PE
ﬁrm. Lastly, α, β, θ1 and θ2 are coeﬃcients to be estimated, and  is an error term that contains
unobserved factors which also aﬀect incentives.
Identiﬁcation of θ1 is based on cross-sectional variation. Even though the dataset includes
a time-dimension, for the reasons explained in Section 3 we do not observe the same company
before and after going private. Hence, we are unable to include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects for the PE-
owned sample, which would have been helpful to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 9 Clearly,
PE ﬁrms do not randomly select their targets. For our purposes, a biased estimate of θ1 will
arise if there are ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobservable factors that are correlated with managerial incentives
and the attraction to PE ﬁrms.
9Firm ﬁxed eﬀects are of no use for the GoingPrivateit sample because we only observe these ﬁrms when they
are public.
9Three factors which are likely to be important determinants of PE acquisitions, which may
also aﬀect managerial incentives are: cash reserves, industry factors (such as availability of
proﬁtable investments), and macroeconomic factors (such as interest rates).10 The above spec-
iﬁcation includes controls for cash, industry dummies, and time dummies, which control for
these three factors, respectively. Hence, θ1 is identiﬁed from within-industry and within-year
variation.
In addition, the inclusion of GoingPrivateit in equation (1) provides us with a diagnostic
for whether the estimate of θ1 is picking up a causal eﬀect of PE, or if θ1 is due to selection—PE
ﬁrms choosing to acquire public companies with already high managerial incentives. Speciﬁcally,
if θ1 = θ2 then public companies that are acquired by PE ﬁrms tend to have the same level of
incentives, in the year before going private, as do PE-owned ﬁrms (prior to IPO). And if θ2 = 0
then public companies that are acquired by PE ﬁrms tend to have the same level of incentives,
in the year before going private, as do public ﬁrms that do not go private.
The estimates for variations on the above speciﬁcation are reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Each of these tables corresponds to one of the three measures of managerial incentives that were
explained in the prior section. For all speciﬁcations in these three tables, an observation is an
executive-year combination. Also, every speciﬁcation in these tables includes year dummies.
4.1 Fraction of Ownership by the Highest Paid Executive
The dependent variable in Table 3 is the Fraction of Stock Owned by the Highest Paid Executive.
Controlling only for year eﬀects, in column (1) we report that the highest paid manager in a PE-
owned business tends to have 4.8 percentage points more equity than the highest paid managers
in public companies. Adding industry dummies in column (2) reduces this diﬀerence by a small
amount, to 4.4%. Including controls for observed ﬁrm characteristics in columns (3) and (4)
reduces the diﬀerence—with the full set of controls and industry dummies, we estimate the
highest paid manager in a PE-owned business has 3.3 percentage points more equity (on average)
than their counterpart in public companies.11 Columns (5) and (6) show speciﬁcations that drop
all ﬁrm/years (from each group) where the ﬁrm employs more people than the 75th-percentile
10See Jensen (1989).
11The estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 99% conﬁdence.
10PE-owned ﬁrm employs. The results are basically unchanged, which indicates that the ﬁndings
are robust to the exclusion of large ﬁrms. Recall from Table 2 that the mean level of executive
ownership (for the highest paid executive) in the comparison sample of public corporations is
3.4%. Hence, the estimate of 3.3% more ownership associated with PE represent a dramatically
higher level of managerial incentives—100% higher. As a reality check on the data, note that
the coeﬃcient on Log(Assets) in all columns of Table 3 is negative and signiﬁcant, picking up
the expected size eﬀect (managers tend to have a smaller fraction of ownership in larger ﬁrms).
As mentioned above, the coeﬃcient on GoingPrivate (θ2) indicates whether private equity
ﬁrms choose targets that already have relatively strong incentives. In the results of the full
speciﬁcation presented in column (4) of Table 3, we report that ˆ θ2 is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. This indicates that public companies that are acquired by PE ﬁrms tend to have
the same level of incentives, in the year before going private, as do public ﬁrms that do not go
private. Unsurprisingly then, we also ﬁnd that ˆ θ2 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ˆ θ1, indicating
that public companies that are acquired by PE ﬁrms tend to have signiﬁcantly lower level of
incentives, in the year before going private, than PE-owned ﬁrms.
To better examine the diﬀerences between PE and public companies in the distribution of
management ownership, rather than just conditional means, Figures 2 and 3 show kernel density
estimates of distributions of executive ownership. Figure 2 shows the empirical distributions for
each type of ﬁrm without conditioning on any other variables. Figure 3 shows the distributions of
executive ownership for each type of company conditional on the full set of controls. Speciﬁcally,
Figure 3 graphs the distributions of the residuals from a regression identical to the one in
column 4 of Table 3, except that the regression excludes PrivateEquity and GoingPrivate
from the set of explanatory variables. Comparing the distributions in both ﬁgures leads to the
same qualitative conclusion: compared to public companies, the distribution of equity owned by
the highest paid executive in PE-owned businesses has greater variance, and puts more weight on
high levels of ownership. In more quantitative terms, in Figure 3 (with controls) the interquartile
range of equity ownership is 8.3% for PE-owned ﬁrms, and 3.7% for public corporations. Also,
in Figure 3, the 75th-percentile is 4.1 percentage points higher for PE-owned ﬁrms than public
ﬁrms.
Our estimates likely understate the diﬀerences between PE-owned ﬁrms and other ﬁrms
11because we treat shares and options the same in our analysis.12 Options make up a larger part
of ownership for the comparison group than for the PE-owned group. But note that each option
creates somewhat less incentive and has less value than a share because the price may be below
the strike price when the executive wants to exercise the option.
Overall, the regression results in Table 3, as well as Figures 2 and 3, make it clear that top
executive ownership is signiﬁcantly larger (both statistically and economically) in PE-owned
ﬁrms than at typical publicly-held corporations.
4.2 Salary of Highest-Paid Executive
The second measure of managerial incentives we examine is salary. We expect ﬁrms that want to
provide stronger incentives would pay lower salaries to their executives for at least two reasons.
First, when expected payouts from incentives are high, then (assuming the risk premium is not
too great) the ﬁrm will want to lower base pay so as to keep compensation costs down. Second,
lower salaries increase incentives of risk averse workers by increasing the likelihood of low pay
(where marginal utility with respect to income is particularly high). We again estimate versions
of equation (1), but now with the dependent variable: Log(Salary of Highest Paid Executive).
Table 4 contains the results. The number of observations is reduced by three from the above
analysis, because there are three ﬁrms with zero salary (and the dependent variable is in logs).
Columns (1) and (2) show that salaries are 42-45% lower at PE-owned companies than public
corporations, conditional only on year and industry dummies. Much of this diﬀerence is simply
because the PE-owned ﬁrms are smaller, however. The results for the complete set of controls
are given in column (4): we estimate that, on average, the salary of the highest paid executive
at PE-owned companies is 11.9% lower than for similar public companies. Again, in columns (5)
and (6) we verify that this ﬁnding is robust to excluding large ﬁrms in the sample.
The estimated coeﬃcient on the GoingPrivate dummy is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
in all speciﬁcations in Table 4. This provides further conﬁdence that the diﬀerences in incentives
we are ﬁnding at PE ﬁrms compared to public ﬁrms is a causal eﬀect, rather than a selection
12Again, we are somewhat limited by the detail of the compensation and ownership data in CapitalIQ. For the
PE-owned sample, we know how many options the executive holds but we do not have details on the date of
expiration, strike price, etc.
12eﬀect.
4.3 Variable Pay Share of Cash Compensation
The third measure of managerial incentives we examine is the Variable Pay Share of Cash
Compensation, deﬁned as: (total cash compensation – salary) / (total cash compensation). Cash
compensation includes salary and bonuses. Hence, the measure is essentially bonuses. Firms that
provide higher incentives will utilize more bonuses, because bonuses are a contingent payoﬀ. We
again estimate versions of equation (1), but now with the dependent variable: Variable Pay Share
of Cash Compensation. Table 5 contains the results. The number of observations is reduced by
one from the analysis of equity ownership because there is one executive-year combination with
zero total cash compensation.
The results are presented in Table 5. The diﬀerence in variable pay share between PE ﬁrms
and public companies is signiﬁcant (with 95% conﬁdence) in all columns. In the full speciﬁcation
reported in column (4), we ﬁnd that PE-owned businesses tend to provide 12.6% higher variable
pay shares than public companies. Recall from the discussion of anecdotal evidence in Section 2
that our interviewees did not have a strong sense of whether bonuses would be higher at PE-
owned companies.
The PrivateEquity coeﬃcient changes when ﬁrm controls are added because larger ﬁrms
pay more overall and, given that executives are risk averse, can put more compensation at
risk. Relative to the large public ﬁrms in the control sample, PE-owned ﬁrms have both lower
salaries and lower incentive-based cash compensation, so that the fraction that is variable works
out about the same for both groups. However, relative to public ﬁrms of the same size, PE-owned
ﬁrms have lower salaries and more variable cash compensation.
The estimated coeﬃcient on the GoingPrivate dummy is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
in speciﬁcations (1) to (4) in Table 5. This variable, however, is signiﬁcantly positive and
similar to the PrivateEquity coeﬃcient speciﬁcation in columns (5) and (6). This suggests that,
excluding the large ﬁrms they acquire, PE ﬁrms tend to acquire companies that provide already
high bonuses. This is the only measure of incentives, speciﬁcation, and subsample for which we
found any evidence of a selection eﬀect on incentives.
134.4 Heterogeneous Eﬀects
The above analysis focuses on mean diﬀerences in managerial incentives between PE-owned and
public companies. However, these diﬀerences may also depend on other interesting factors. For
instance, there is reason to expect that the diﬀerences between public corporations and PE-
owned businesses have decreased over time, as public companies learn to mimic the practices of
PE ﬁrms. Or as Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue, public ﬁrms have been catching up with
PE practices during the 1990s, driven by: (i) innovation in information and communications
technology made capital markets more eﬃcient (i.e., enhanced disciplining); and (ii) deregula-
tion increased the rewards to restructuring. We therefore ask whether the gap in managerial
incentives between PE companies and public companies has been shrinking over time?
To examine this possibility, we generalize the speciﬁcation in equation (1) to allow θ1 and θ2
to have diﬀerent values in the years 1996–2001 and 2002–2005. In Table 6 we report the results
for two diﬀerent measures of managerial incentives: fraction of equity owned by the highest paid
executive, and salary of the highest paid executive (the ﬁrst two measures examined above). In
each case we report the estimates for the coeﬃcient on PrivateEquity interacted with a group
dummy. In column (1) it is apparent that the diﬀerence between PE and public companies in
terms of equity ownership has not changed over time. However, in column (2) of the table it is
apparent that the average diﬀerence in salary has increased over time, in contrast to what we
expected. Hence, the evidence does not indicate convergence over time in managerial incentives
between public and PE-owned companies.
A second form of heterogeneity we explore is size eﬀects: is the gap in managerial incentives
between PE companies and public companies diﬀerent for big versus small companies? This is of
interest because agency costs are likely to be higher in larger companies (e.g. harder to monitor)
and incentives may create more risk for a CEO in a larger company. Also, there is a trend
towards bigger PE acquisitions. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 we report estimates for the
equity ownership and salary measures, for the largest 25% of PE-owned ﬁrms, and the smallest
25% of PE-owned ﬁrms. The measure of size is based on the number of employees (of the PE-
owned company). For both measures, we ﬁnd that incentives in PE-owned companies, relative
to public companies, are greater in large ﬁrms. An explanation for this ﬁnding is that agency
problems are greater in large companies, leading PE ﬁrms to implement stronger incentives.
14A third form of heterogeneity relates to diﬀerences across PE ﬁrms, which may diﬀer in the
degree to which they emphasize managerial incentives versus other mechanisms such as replacing
management, enhanced oversight, and the importance of debt.13 In other words, how homoge-
neous are the practices of PE ﬁrms, and how substitutable are they? As a basic test of such
diﬀerences, we ask whether top-tier PE ﬁrms tend to implement diﬀerent managerial incentives
than other PE ﬁrms? To identify the top-tier PE ﬁrms, we adopt the “power list” in the March
5, 2007, issue of Fortune: Blackstone, KKR, Carlyle, TPG, Bain Capital, Providence Equity
Partners, Apollo Advisors, Warburg Pincus, Cerberus, and Thomas H. Lee. In columns (5)
and (6) of Table 6 we show that the diﬀerences in managerial incentives between the top-tier
PE ﬁrms and non-top-tier ﬁrms are insigniﬁcant. This is far from conclusive, but it suggests
that diﬀerent PE ﬁrms tend to implement similar changes at the ﬁrms they acquire.
4.5 Summary
To summarize the key results in this section, we ﬁnd that, relative to public corporations, PE-
owned ﬁrms: (i) provide the highest paid executive with 3.3 percentage points more equity (that
is, approximately twice as much); (ii) 11.9% lower salary; and (iii) 12.6% higher variable pay
share. These estimates are all based on a speciﬁcation in which we control for year dummies,
industry dummies, and various observed ﬁrm characteristics. Our analysis also indicates these
estimates are not driven by selection eﬀects and can plausibly be interpreted as the causal impact
of PE ownership.
How do these results compare to prior research? Kaplan (1989) did not analyze salaries and
variable pay shares, but did analyze equity shares. Studying buyouts between 1980 and 1986,
Kaplan found that mean pre-buyout CEO equity share was 7.1% and the mean post-buyout
CEO equity share was 14.7%—an increase of 7.6%, or roughly twice the mean ownership of pre-
buyout CEOs.14 Compared to the data used in this study, the average level of equity ownership
by the CEO is much higher, both before and after going private. However, the proportional
change is roughly similar in both studies—around two times greater ownership share as a PE
portfolio company.
13See Cressy, Munari and Malipiero (2007) for a related analysis of diﬀerences in PE performance based on the
degree of specialization.
14Conditioning on the sub-sample of CEOs that were present before and after the buyout, Kaplan found that
equity shares increased from 6.4% to 14.5%, on average.
15Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) study 72 companies that had an IPO between 1976 and
1987, and had previously undergone an LBO (similar to our sample design). They ﬁnd the mean
fraction of equity owned by the CEO was 17.7% when private, and 12.7% when public. The
level of these magnitudes is more in-line with Kaplan (1989), but the proportional diﬀerences
are lower than in our study (and in Kaplan, 1989).
5 Operational Diﬀerences Between Private Equity Owned
Businesses and Public Corporations
Having shown that PE ﬁrms signiﬁcantly (statistically and economically) increase managerial
incentives relative to public companies, based on U.S. data for the period 1996 to 2004, the
question naturally arises as to whether there are corresponding improvements in operational
performance? This question has actually received much more attention in the literature than
the changes in managerial incentives by PE ﬁrms. Indeed, there are numerous papers, with a
wide range of results, looking for evidence of value creation by PE ﬁrms. In Table 7 we present
a summary of this literature. Conclusions depend on what measure, time period, geographic
location of the sample is used and how the sample is constructed (type of acquisition and type
of exit). In this section we also examine this kind of evidence for our sample.
Although not a measure of performance, as a reality check on the data, we ﬁrst analyze
the changes in the importance of debt. We analyze the debt-assets ratio instead of the more
conventional debt-equity ratio, because negative equity is not uncommon in the data. Again,
using Petco as an example, Figure 4 shows that PE ownership is associated with a dramatic
increase in debt. Petco’s debt returned to its pre-PE level slowly over a few years after it went
public again. We will again show that Petco is reasonably typical of other PE-owned ﬁrms.
To examine changes in debt for the broader sample, we regress the debt-assets ratio on
the same controls as column (4) in Tables 3 to 5. The results are provided in column (1) of
Table 8. As expected, we ﬁnd that PE ownership causes an average increase of 51.1% in the debt-
assets ratio. We also ﬁnd that the debt-assets ratio in going-private companies is insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the public company control sample, indicating that this eﬀect is not driven by
selection.
16We now turn to measures of proﬁtability and operational eﬃciency. First, Figure 5 shows
ROA at Petco over its various forms of ownership. The graph indicates that, if anything, Petco
was less proﬁtable during its years under PE ownership. A trend up in proﬁts ended when the
ﬁrm was bought by TPG and Leonard Green in 2000, and another one began after the ﬁrm was
returned to public ownership. However, Petco’s ownership coincided with a recession, so it is
important to look at this in a regression context where we can control for time eﬀects.
Using the same regression framework and controls we used for the debt-assets ratio and the
incentive measures, we examine the following performance measures: Return on Assets (ROA),
EBITDA / (Total Assets), Sales Per Employee, and Employees / (Total Assets). The results
for each of these dependent variables are reported in columns (2) to (5) of Table 8. The only
one of these measures to show a signiﬁcant (and positive) eﬀect from PE ownership is Sales Per
Employee. In this case, there is also no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the going-private ﬁrms
and the public controls.
Sales Per Employee aside, the general message of the analysis in this section is that we
ﬁnd little evidence of PE causing performance improvements. As shown in Table 7, this is
not unprecedented in the prior research. We also looked at the correlation between the level
of incentives and these measures of proﬁts and eﬃciency, without ﬁnding any obviously strong
relationships. Thus far, we have not found any evidence that the increased incentives we doc-
umented in the prior section improve bottom-line performance. While one might suspect that
this is because the ﬁrms that go into PE ownership are often turnarounds and their PE owners
are successful in returning them to ﬁnancial health, this would imply that ﬁrms in our going
private sample would be underperforming their peers at the time we measure them. We see no
evidence to support that idea. While this lack of evidence of operational eﬃciency advantages
of PE ownership could be caused by the limits of using accounting data to compare public and
private companies, by outliers, or other data issues, it is puzzling that our ﬁnding of signiﬁcant
increases in incentives is not accompanied by performance improvements.
176 Longevity of Increased Incentives after IPO
One of the virtues of our dataset is that we focus on PE-owned companies that undergo an IPO,
which allows us to examine changes after the ﬁrm transitions from private to public. So we
now analyze the longevity of the higher degree of managerial incentives once these companies
go public. There are at least a couple of reasons why this is interesting. If the higher degree
of managerial incentives during the private ownership phases, rapidly fall after IPO (or reverse
buyout), then it suggests PE ﬁrms do not implement long-lasting organizational changes in the
companies they acquire. Also, PE ﬁrms have been criticized by some commentators for “quick
ﬂips”: buying companies and selling them shortly after (in one year, say) for a large proﬁt. The
suggestion is that one year is too short a time to implement real or permanent improvements in
an organization, so the proﬁt must stem from either underpaying for the company or overselling
it to the new owners. However, if managers continue to maintain high equity stakes in their
company after the IPO, then this suggests the IPO valuation may not be artiﬁcially high, because
the managers also have signiﬁcant wealth at stake.
To examine the longevity of managerial incentives following reverse buyouts, we generalize
equation (1) in the following way:







θkGoingPrivateit + it. (2)
Instead of including only the ﬁrst available observation for PE-owned ﬁrms that go public,
we now include annual observations for the year before the IPO and each subsequent year up
to four years after the IPO. The θj’s capture how managerial incentives (or other dependent
variables) evolve at these ﬁrms from just before the IPO until four years after. Similarly, instead
of including only the last public year for the going private sample, we now include all available
years and the θk’s track how incentives evolve in the years leading up to the purchase by a PE
ﬁrm.
Rather than present regression coeﬃcients, we graph the θ’s and corresponding 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals. Figure 6 shows the θ’s from a regression that estimates equation 2 with fraction
ownership of the highest paid executive as the dependent variable and all the control variables
used in column 4 of Table 3. The graph shows that the θk’s are generally small for all years
leading up to ﬁrms going private and there is no obvious trend before PE investments. The evo-
18lution of the PE-owned sample (and the θj’s), however, shows that executive ownership drops
quickly and substantially right after the IPO. Managerial ownership is very high before the IPO
and at the time of the IPO, but quickly drops to levels similar to public ﬁrms. This suggests
that whatever incentives PE ﬁrms put in place for managers of the companies they own last only
as long as the PE ownership lasts. The ﬁrms do not appear to put in place diﬀerent incentive
systems that outlive the PE investment.
Figure 7 presents similar time trends for the salary of the highest paid executive. Again, the
θk’s are small, insigniﬁcant, and do not exhibit a trend leading up to the PE investment. The
PE-owned ﬁrms again revert to compensation systems that are equivalent to those of public
companies, though salary takes longer (three to four years) to reach public company levels than
stock ownership does. Again, it appears that any incentive changes made by PE investors are
only in place during the PE phase.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior study has examined the longevity of managerial
incentives following reverse buyouts. However, several prior studies have also examined the
longevity of ﬁrm performance after reverse buyouts. Most recently Cao and Lerner (2007) ﬁnd
that reverse buyouts tend to outperform (measured by ROA) IPOs for up to ﬁve years, and this
is robust throughout the period 1980 to 2002.15
In Figure 8 we conﬁrms that the capital structure eﬀects of private equity (that is, more
debt relative to public ﬁrms) is also limited to the PE phase. Debt-asset ratios are much higher
immediately before and around the time of the IPO but revert to typical public company levels
within a year or two. Finally, Figure 9 looks at trends in the one operational measure where we
found some reason to think PE owned ﬁrms perform well—sales per employee. The individual
year θj’s and θk’s are measured with considerable error, so we do not want to read too much
into this graph. But, taking the θk coeﬃcients at face value, it appears that PE ﬁrms buy ﬁrms
that are trending down in terms of sales/employee. Also, to the extent that ﬁrms emerge from
PE ownership with high sales/employee, that eﬀect appears to dissipate over a few years.
Overall, the graphs and the corresponding regressions in this section suggest that, while there
are some important diﬀerences between PE-owned ﬁrms and comparable public companies, these
diﬀerences are limited to the period in companies’ lives when they are owned by PE ﬁrms. We
15See also the references cited in Cao and Lerner (2007).
19do not ﬁnd evidence that these ﬁrms put in place incentive systems or operational eﬃciency
that outlives their ownership.
7 Conclusion
As Murphy (1999) remarks in the ﬁrst sentence of his article: “Few issues in the history of the
modern corporation have attracted the attention garnered by executive compensation in United
States companies.” But nearly all of that research concerns public companies, and there is good
reason to believe managerial incentives are quite diﬀerent in private ﬁrms—increased managerial
incentives are often cited as one of the key drivers of value creation in companies taken private
(PE buyouts). A number of questions immediately arise. Do PE ﬁrms in fact increase managerial
incentives? If so, by how much? How deep do increased incentives tend to go in such companies?
Are there other diﬀerences with public ocmpanies in terms of how incentives are structured?
Why don’t public companies provide similar incentives? Are public companies moving in this
direction? How important is increasing managerial incentives as a driver of value creation in PE-
owned companies? When the PE owner exits (by IPO, say) are the higher incentives enduring?
These are core questions for understanding the mechanisms by which PE ﬁrms create value
and generate returns for their investors. Furthermore, these questions are just as relevant to
understanding the causes and consequences of executive compensation in public corporations.
Using data from 144 companies that were owned by PE investors and subsequently went
public during the period 1996 to 2005, we study diﬀerences in incentives, capital structure, and
operational performance between PE-owned companies and comparable public corporations.
Our research provides a more current and broader analysis of the changes in managerial incen-
tives that take place in private equity buyouts of public companies than the prior literature. In
doing so, we make progress on some of the above questions, although certainly not all.
We ﬁnd that top managers of PE-owned ﬁrms have substantially higher-powered compensa-
tion contracts than their counterparts at public companies: executives at PE-owned ﬁrms own
more equity, have lower salaries, and get more of their annual cash compensation in variable
pay than managers at public ﬁrms. Executives at ﬁrms that are public but about to get bought
by PE ﬁrms exhibit no such diﬀerences relative to other public ﬁrms, suggesting that PE ﬁrms
20implement these incentive contracts, rather than selecting ﬁrms that already use high-powered
incentives. We also verify that PE ﬁrms hold much more debt than otherwise comparable public
ﬁrms (not surprisingly).
We showed that these diﬀerences between PE-owned and public ﬁrms do not extend to
most measures of operational eﬃciency and they are quickly undone when ﬁrms return to public
ownership. These results raise questions about the value created by private equity. Why are high
powered incentive contracts valuable to PE ﬁrms if they do not correspond to higher returns,
and why are public shareholders willing to pay PE ﬁrms handsome proﬁts for the ﬁrms they
take public if these ﬁrms quickly take on the characteristics of similar public ﬁrms?
While it is puzzling that increased managerial incentives in PE-owned companies are seem-
ingly not associated with improved performance, it should be noted that the question of whether
managerial incentives matter has not been resolved in the broader human resources literature
(see the discussion in Murphy, 1999).16 It is conceivable that managerial incentives are not a
primary determinant of proﬁts (at least within the range of incentives we observe.) If they were,
and if PE ﬁrms are somehow uniquely capable of increasing incentives in ways that public ﬁrms
are unable to, then PE activity might be less sensitive to debt market conditions than it appears
to be (see Axelson, et al, 2008).17
16See also Hall and Liebman (1998), and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999).
17See also the indirect evidence presented by Bargeron, et al (2007).
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23Table 1. Timing of Ownership Transitions
Private Equity Going Private
Acquisition IPO Acquisition
1996 25 9
1997 20 13 2
1998 21 10 9
1999 28 17 5
2000 9 15 5
2001 10 12 2
2002 13 6 2
2003 10 29 4
2004 8 33 14
2005 30
2006 16
Total 144 144 89
“Private Equity” sample includes ﬁrms where CapitalIQ indicates a major investment by a private equity ﬁrm
(“acquisition”) and a subsequent IPO between 1996 and 2005. “Going Private” ﬁrms are companies that CapitalIQ
indicates had a “going private” transaction in 1998 or later, and that are in the ExecuComp database for at least
one year between 1995 and 2006.
24Table 2. Summary Statistics
Private Equity Going Private Comparison Sample
Firms 144 89 2555
Firm/Years 662 711 19,768
Assets $832 $3,728 $14,983
[335] [1,091] [1,733]
(1,522) (6,587) (77,480)
Sales $671 $2,455 $5,326
[279] [1,053] [1,259]
(1,324) (3,561) (15,854)
Market Capitalization $874 $3,107 $7,662
[562] [902] [1,735]
(1,065) (5,100) (23,895)
Employees 3,640 18,747 18,800
[1,602] [7,100] [4,803]
(6,562) (36,574) (59,152)
Cash/Assets 6.9% 10.9% 16.2%
[3.3%] [6.2%] [9.0%]
(10.2%) (13.0%) (17.8%)
Executive Ownership 8.76% 5.29% 3.44%
[5.53%] [2.26%] [1.77%]
(14.77%) (7.42%) (5.59%)
Salary $405K $688K $721K
[$376K] [$675K] [$654K]
($190K) ($312K) ($377K)
Non-Salary Cash Pay 42.4% 35.1% 43.6%
[46.2%] [41.1%] [49.2%]
(23.1%) (26.6%) (24.4%)
See notes to Table 1 for description of sample in each column. “Private Equity” ﬁrm characteristics are for
year after IPO. “Going Private” ﬁrm characteristics are for last full year as a public company. “Comparison
Sample” ﬁrm characteristics are for 2004. Firm characteristic information is in $millions. ‘Pay information is for
all available executive-years. “Non-Salary Cash Pay” is the fraction of an executives cash compensation that is
not salary: (total cash compensation - salary)/ total cash compensation. Sample medians are in brackets and
standard deviations are in parentheses.
25Table 3. Eﬀect of Private Equity on Fraction of Stock Owned
by the Highest Paid Executive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PrivateEquity 0.0476 0.0437 0.0343 0.0326 0.0275 0.0226
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0066) (0.0064)
GoingPrivate 0.0188 0.0100 0.0135 0.0094 0.0026 -0.0008
(0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0118) (0.0113)
Log(Assets) -0.0084 -0.0102 -0.0085 -0.0083
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Cash/Assets 0.0131 0.0139 0.0102 0.0138
(0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0042)
Log(Sales) -0.0036 -0.0027 -0.0023 -0.0034
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Log(Employees) 0.0036 0.0038 0.0028 0.0031
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0011)
2-digit SIC dummies no yes no yes no yes
Sample All All All All Drop Largest Drop Largest
R2 0.0087 0.0744 0.0755 0.1241 0.0484 0.1366
Observations 20,001 20,001 20,001 20,001 9,680 9,680
Each regression includes dummies for the years 1995 through 2006.
26Table 4. Eﬀect of Private Equity on Log(Salary of Highest Paid Executive)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PrivateEquity -0.4474 -0.4163 -0.1338 -0.1188 -0.1024 -0.0917
(0.0413) (0.0390) (0.0286) (0.0271) (0.0328) (0.0312)
GoingPrivate -0.0216 -0.0119 0.0276 0.0113 0.0096 -0.0141
(0.0526) (0.0494) (0.0362) (0.0341) (0.0582) (0.0547)
Log(Assets) 0.0756 0.1015 0.1008 0.1201
(0.0026) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0056)
Cash/Assets -0.0109 -0.0072 0.0624 0.0638
(0.0150) (0.0160) (0.0185) (0.0201)
Log(Sales) 0.0999 0.0970 0.0970 0.0888
(0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0062)
Log(Employees) 0.0509 0.0362 0.0124 0.0164
(0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0055)
2-digit SIC dummies no yes no yes no yes
Sample All All All All Drop Largest Drop Largest
R2 0.0745 0.1931 0.5626 0.6163 0.4032 0.4819
Observations 19,998 19,998 19,998 19,998 9,680 9,680
Each regression includes dummies for the years 1995 through 2006.
27Table 5. Eﬀect of Private Equity on Variable Pay Share of Cash Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PrivateEquity 0.0430 0.0464 0.1346 0.1259 0.1235 0.1122
(0.0206) (0.0200) (0.0194) (0.0190) (0.0217) (0.0213)
GoingPrivate -0.0163 -0.0015 0.0155 0.0095 0.1186 0.1007
(0.0261) (0.0253) (0.0245) (0.0239) (0.0385) (0.0374)
Log(Assets) 0.0228 0.0113 0.0171 0.0158
(0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0038)
Cash/Assets 0.1120 0.1105 0.1316 0.1246
(0.0102) (0.0112) (0.0122) (0.0137)
Log(Sales) 0.0494 0.0546 0.0617 0.0573
(0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0042)
Log(Employees) -0.0203 -0.0119 -0.0261 -0.0209
(0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0037)
2-digit SIC dummies no yes no yes no yes
Sample All All All All Drop Largest Drop Largest
R2 0.0485 0.1209 0.1629 0.2128 0.1124 0.1765
Observations 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 9,680 9,680
Variable pay share of cash compensation is deﬁned as (total cash compensation - salary) / (total cash compensa-
tion). Each regression includes dummies for the years 1995 through 2006.
28Table 6. Heterogeneity in Private Equity Eﬀects on Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Ownership Salary Ownership Salary Ownership Salary
Group 1 Post-2001 IPO Top 25% Employees Top 10 PE Firm
0.0363 -0.1621 0.0562 -0.1016 0.0458 -0.1197
(0.0076) (0.0394) (0.0103) (0.0532) (0.0099) (0.0512)
Group 2 2001 or earlier IPO Bottom 25% Employees Other Firm
0.0343 -0.0768 0.0368 -0.0540 0.0313 -0.1158
(0.0072) (0.0371) (0.0105) (0.0541) (0.0062) (0.0317)
Each regression is based on the same speciﬁcation as in column 4 of Tables 3 (odd columns of this table) or 4
(even columns) with the PrivateEquity variable broken into at least two groups. Top 10 PE ﬁrm in columns 5
and 6 includes the ten private equity ﬁrms on the Power List in the March 5, 2007 issue of Fortune: Blackstone,
KKR, Carlyle, TPG, Bain Capital, Providence Equity Partners, Apollo Advisors, Warbarg Pincus, Cerberus, and
Thomas H. Lee. Note that Groups 1 and 2 diﬀer at 12% level in column 2, 19% signiﬁcance level in column 3,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 8. Eﬀect of Private Equity on Operational Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Debt/Assets ROA EBITDA/Assets Sales/Emp Emp/Assets
PrivateEquity 0.5154 0.0129 0.0156 131.80 -0.0010
(0.0199) (0.0164) (0.0111) (68.58) (0.0017)
GoingPrivate 0.0349 0.0137 0.0040 -61.80 -0.0012
(0.0250) (0.0206) (0.0142) (86.26) (0.0022)
R2 0.3187 0.0921 0.2378 0.1240 0.1449
Each regression includes controls similar to those in column 4 of Tables 3 to 5, except column 4 which excluded
controls for sales and employees, and column 5 which excludes the asset control variable. Note: PrivateEquity
and GoingPrivate are diﬀerent at 1% signiﬁcance level in column 1, and at the 8% signiﬁcance level in column 4.










































Devine joined Petco as CEO in 
August, 1990. He also became 
chairman in  1994.
May 2000: TPG and 





March 2004: Devine 
steps down as CEO but 
remains Chairman
July 2006: Barclays and 
Goldman Sachs take 
Petco private again
32Figure 2: Kernel Densities of Unconditional Distributions of Fraction of Equity Owned
by Highest Paid Executive in PE and Public Companies
33Figure 3: Kernel Densities of Conditional Distributions of Fraction of Equity Owned
by Highest Paid Executive in PE and Public Companies
Conditional on same controls as Table 3, column (4).
34Figure 4: Debt-Assets Ratio at Petco
 
35Figure 5: ROA at Petco
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